When tasked to find fraudulent social network users, what is a practitioner to do? Traditional classification can lead to poor generalization and high misclassification given few and possibly biased labels. We tackle this problem by analyzing fraudulent behavioral patterns, featurizing users to yield strong discriminative performance, and building algorithms to handle new and multimodal fraud types. First, we set up honeypots, or "dummy" social network accounts on which we solicit fake followers (after careful IRB approval). We report the signs of such behaviors, including oddities in local network connectivity, account attributes, and similarities and differences across fraud providers. We discover several types of fraud behaviors, with the possibility of even more. We discuss how to leverage these insights in practice, build strongly performing entropy-based features, and propose OEC (Open-ended Classification), an approach for "future-proofing" existing algorithms to account for the complexities of link fraud. Our contributions are (a) observations: we analyze our honeypot fraudster ecosystem and give insights regarding various fraud behaviors, (b) features: we engineer features which give exceptionally strong (>0.95 precision/recall) discriminative power on ground-truth data, and (c) algorithm: we motivate and discuss OEC which reduces misclassification rate by >18% over baselines and routes practitioner attention to samples at high-risk of misclassification.
Introduction
How can a social network security practitioner find fraudulent users on his network? Understanding the behavior and actions of fraudsters and incorporating these insights into detection algorithms is paramount to preventing fraud. Previous works in social network fraud detection have primarily focused on leveraging signature properties of fraudsters for detection including temporally synchronized behavior [3] , excessively dense [19] and oddly distributed [20] graph connectivity, uncommon account names [7] and spammy links [9] . Our work instead focuses on an exploratory analysis and characterization of the multifaceted fraudster ecosystem, and towards building algorithms robust to multiple patterns of fraud.
We focus on one particular setting of social network fraud called link fraud which involves the use of fake, sockpuppet accounts to create links (graph connections) which represent followership of target users. Fake links artificially inflate the follower count of customer accounts, deceive authentic users and hinder the performance of machine learning algorithms which rely on authentic user input to recommend relevant content to their userbase.
Supervised classification is the commonly-used state-of-the-art approach for finding such fake accounts in practice. Typically, practitioners represent users with some features and employ a binary classification scheme which aims to separate genuine from fraudulent users. The classification process relies on a suitable training set of known, labeled genuine and fraudulent users, which is used in to make generalized decisions for the userbase. However, in practice, obtaining ground-truth labels requires costly manual inspection and as a result, only an insignificant fraction (<0.1%) of users' labels are known [18] , which can lead to poor generalization and misclassification. Often times, the labeling process is biased (i.e. towards "obvious" fraudsters) and unrepresentative of the dataset, severely worsening these problems. Misclassification manifests in terms of false positives and negatives, which are especially costly in fraud detection. To alleviate this issue, we tackle the following important task and subtasks.
Problem 1 (Informal). Given a social network with few labeled nodes and many unlabeled nodes, infer labels for the unlabeled nodes and route attention to those nodes which are risky to classify as members of the existing classes.
1. Study and identify patterns of fraudster behavior. 2. Leverage these patterns using powerful features that can discriminate fraudsters from genuine users. 3. Design an algorithm which can use these features to classify users and discern problematic nodes.
To study the behavior of fraudsters, we employ the use of honeypots, or dummy accounts on which we solicit fake Twitter followers sourced from various fraud providers. Honeypots give us a clear signal of fake follower activity untainted by authentic behavior. Upon setting up the honeypot accounts and purchasing fake followers, we instrument a number of carefully engineered tracking scripts which poll Twitter API and collect a rich representation of the fraudster ecosystem which we subsequently analyze. We discover a number of different fraudster behaviors, with the possibility of even more types (see Figure 1 ). Through Notice the block community structure in genuine followers compared to the star structure for premium and near-clique structure for freemium followers. (d) shows differences in attribute entropy over the various behaviors, showing how fraud patterns skew attribute distributions away from genuine ones. our analysis, we engineer strong features which enable us to discriminate these fraudulent users from genuine ones. Lastly, we present our OEC (Open-ended Classification) approach, which aims to robustly infer user labels given a labeled set while alerting practitioners to unusual users who have a high risk for misclassification (see Figure 2) . Summarily, our work offers the following notable contributions:
• Observations: We collect and analyze ground-truth fraudster data, and make numerous insights about the multiple behaviors of link fraudsters.
• Features: We carefully engineer useful features which allow us to accurately discern fraudsters from genuine users.
• Algorithm: We propose OEC, an approach for inferring user labels, routing attention and reducing misclassification.
Related Work
We broadly categorize related work into two categories: studies on underground markets and fraud detection approaches. Underground Markets: Prior works have shown the use of fake accounts for followers in social media [24] , phone-verified email accounts [23] , Facebook likes [3] , etc. These accounts are often used to spread spam [9, 8] , rumors and false information [10, 11] . [25, 17] explore underground markets providing fake content, reviews and solutions to web-based security mechanisms. [24] studies several fraud providers over time and describes trends in pricing, account names and IP diversity. [22] compares growth rates between accounts with legitimate and fraudulent followers. [1] observes the varying retention and reliability of various fraud providers. Comparatively, our work is the first to identify major social graph differences between fraud types and across providers. Fraud Detection: [2, 15] use profile features to detect spammers on Twitter. [21] passively analyzes accounts with promiscuous following behavior and builds a classifier using profile and messaging features. [5, 26] aim to find fake accounts in social networks via a generative stochastic model and a random-walk based method respectively -both assume small cuts between fake and genuine nodes. [3, 6] use graph-traversal based methods to find users with temporally synchronized actions on Facebook. [20, 13, 19] propose spectral methods which identify dense or odd graph structures indicative of fraud. [16] studies the related problem of classification where training samples only exist for one class. [4] proposes co-training when two views of data are present. Our work complements these by identifying multiple modes of fraudster behavior in social networks and expanding detection algorithms to account for multimodality, in the presence of a single view of data and labels for more than one class.
Setup and Data Collection
In this section, we briefly discuss our experimental setup and data collection process for scraping information about the network structure and account attributes associated with honeypots, fake followers and neighboring accounts on Twitter. We additionally introduce several data types and metrics we use in the remainder of the work. Purchasing Fake Followers: We obtain a list of popular fraud service providers via Google search using queries such as "buy Twitter followers." In surveying these, we notice there are two prevalent models of service -we call these premium and freemium. Premium services offer customers followers in tiers (1K, 5K, 10K, etc.) for payment and ask only for the customer's Twitter username. Freemium services offer a paid option as in premium services, but additionally offer a free alternative which instead requires the user to provide their Twitter login details to the service -in return for these details, the services promise to direct a small number of followers to the account. We next setup a pool of honeypot accounts by repeating the Twitter account creation process a number of times using monikers from online screenname generators. Account creation was spread over IPs due to Twitter's IP-based account creation limits. We next purchased the basic, 1K follower packages from several premium and paid freemium services, avoiding rarely used ones with low Alexa rank. Summarily, we bought 1K followers from 8 different services (4 freemium, 4 premium) to 2 honeypot accounts per service. We used 2 accounts per service instead of 1 in order to further examine account reuse policies of fraud providers. Table 1 summarizes the details of this process. Honeypots were created on the same day, and follower purchases were all done simultaneously. Furthermore, the honeypots attracted no followers themselves prior to our purchases. As a result, we posit that all followers of the honeypots are fake. Instrumentation: We use the REST API to scrape data relevant to our operation from Twitter. As the API heavily rate-limits various data resource types, we can only collect limited information [14] . Prior to purchasing followers, we start a number of Python scripts which poll the API at varying intervals due to rate-limit policies and populate a database with the information. We collect honeypot account details, their follower's IDs and details, and the IDs and details of the followers' own friends and followers to scope out other accounts with known fraudulent connections. These details include number of Tweets, language, profile descriptions, default or custom profile settings, etc. Our carefully engineered tracking scripts are publicly available for use at https://goo.gl/5wnYpc. Preliminaries: We next introduce several data structures used in our work. An ego network (egonet) traditionally consists of a central node (ego), as well as the neighboring nodes and the edges between them. In this paper, we examine per-service egonets, where we consider the union of the individual egonets of both honeypot accounts per service. This allows us to study how fraud providers reuse their accounts between purchases. We also propose and define the boomerang network as the per-service egonet plus the out-links of the followers -the structure is reminiscent of a boomerang, in that it goes "1 step back, 1 step forward" from the honeypot. The boomerang network gives us insights into the external relationships formed by fake followers, whereas the egonet gives insights into the internal relationships between the fake followers and honeypots.
We additionally define several metrics for convenience. Given the node set N and edge set E, density is standardly defined as |E|/(N (N −1)), or the proportion of existing to possible edges. Given node sets N 1 and N 2 and the edge set between them E N1→N2 , bipartite density is defined as E N1→N2 /(|N 1 ||N 2 |), or the proportion of existing to possible edges between the parts. Overlap coefficient is defined as |N 1 ∩N 2 |/min(|N 1 |,|N 2 |) and represents the degree of overlap between sets. The multiple systems estimate (MSE), defined as (|N 1 ||N 2 |)/|N 1 ∩N 2 | estimates the total population size based on overlap between two random samples. Given the graph has T triangles and W wedges (connected triples), transitivity is defined as 3T /W and denotes the degree of triadic closure. Given the graph's bidirectional edge set E ↔ and edge set E, reciprocity is defined as E ↔ /E and indicates the frequency of reciprocated edges. Lastly, given distribution X with outcomes (x 1 ...x n ), entropy is defined as − n i=1 P (x i )log 2 P (x i ) and measures information content in bits. We first focus on studying the local network properties of fraudulent accounts. Targeting oddities in network connectivity is a central theme in many link fraud detection approaches, as the mission constraints of delivering fake links to customers necessarily induces changes in graph structure. But what are these changes? In this section, we leverage a number of social network analysis tools to characterize the effects of fraud on the surrounding network structure, and show the similarities and differences between premium and freemium fraud. Below, we detail our analyses on two types of induced subgraphs from our collected data: the ego network and more expansive boomerang network.
Network Observations
(a) fastfollowerz (b) intertwitter (c) devumi (d) twitterboost (e) plusfollower (f) newfollow (g) hitfollow (h) bigfolo
Ego Network Patterns
We begin our analysis by focusing on per-service egonet structure. Figure 3 shows the per-service egonets for each of the 8 providers, with increased node size and darkness corresponding to higher in-degree. The honeypots (egos) are the two large and dark orange colored nodes in each subfigure. Cursory analysis reveals a highly interesting difference in egonet network structure between freemium and premium providers. We see that the premium egonets (first row) have a star or bipartite structure: in all cases, each honeypot node is the hub of a star, and the satellite nodes overlap and are disconnected. Conversely, freemium egonets in the second row have a denser, near-clique type structure which suggests much higher levels of connectivity between the neighboring nodes.
The statistics for premium service egonets in Table 2 (top) further lend credence to the visual differences we observe from Figure 3 , giving us the following insight:
Insight 1 (Premium Egonet Sparsity). Premium fake followers rarely follow each other, resulting in sparse egonet structure. This is substantiated by the low density and low node to edge ratios across the premium providers. Of these, fastfollowerz and intertwitter interestingly have an order of magnitude greater density than devumi and twitterboost. The node to edge ratios serve to explain these differences, showing an almost 1:2 node to edge ratio in the former 2 providers as compared to the near 1:1 ratios of the latter 2. fastfollowerz and intertwitter also have marginally higher transitivity values compared to the 0 transitivity values of devumi and twitterboost, indicating that the former 2 have a small number of triangles between the fake follower nodes whereas the latter 2 have none. We also observe no reciprocal links in these providers, indicating that all relationships are unidirectional.
Conversely, the freemium service statistics in Table 2 (bottom) are rather different, and support the following complementary insight:
Insight 2 (Freemium Egonet Density). Freemium fake followers often follow each other, resulting in dense egonet structure.
Freemium providers are an order of magnitude denser than the densest premium egonets -all 4 providers have 6-7% density. While not shown in interest of space, the per-honeypot egonets were each found to have an even higher 11-14% density individually. The 1:50 node to edge ratios substantiate this high density. This is in stark contrast to the low ratios of the premium egonets. We also notice that transitivity values are much higher for freemium providers, suggesting that an unusually high 28-30% of wedges are also triangles. Given that density and transitivity are equal in random graphs, the freemium egonets do not appear to be random, but are likely composed of dense subregions which are themselves sparsely connected. The link structure reflects how freemium providers trade follows between accounts (random partitions, biased selection, account similarity, etc.) Furthermore, all 4 providers have similar, high reciprocity of 40-42% suggesting frequent "follow-back" behavior. Rationale: These differences are largely explained by the follower trading strategy employed by freemium providers to entice users to join their service. By accumulating a pool of free accounts, trading follows enables each free user to gain some followers. As a result, these free users not only trade follows to inflate their own follower counts and thereby create a denser graph, but are also used by providers to deliver the follower demands of paid customers and turn a profit. Comparatively, premium providers are unable to use free users' accounts and must create fake accounts.
These insights pose an interesting question: as we expect fraudsters to act in a manner that maximizes profit, what motivates the differences in structure between freemium and premium providers? We propose an answer: If we consider that each account has a budget of edges it can create without being suspended, it seems that in premium providers greatly underutilizes accounts compared to freemium providers. This is because for fraudsters, delivering more links while avoiding suspension is strictly better as it means that they can either serve more customers or artificially inflate their own popularity. But, as we see in the next section, premium providers are actually able to better utilize their fake followers than freemium providers by capitalizing on external rather than internal connectivity. 
Boomerang Network Patterns
To study external connectivity, we next explore properties of per-service boomerang networks. Figure 4 shows 2 boomerang networks, one for bigfolo and twitterboost, each representative of a different fraud strategy. Again, honeypot accounts are amongst the large, dark nodes with high in-degree, and the lighter, smaller nodes are fake followers or their friends. Note that the layout clusters nodes based on similar linkage, so groups of nodes visually close share connectivity properties. As with the egonets, we again see a stark contrast in the boomerang network structure of these two providers. Figure 4a shows the dense internal connectivity of bigfolo's fake followers (as we saw in Figure 3h ), in conjunction with the sparser and less compact external connectivity to their friends. Conversely, Figure 3d shows the sparse internal connectivity between twitterboost's fake followers on the left, but the dense near-bipartite external connectivity to the customers (including honeypots) on the right. Table 3 (top) gives a number of summary statistics about premium boomerang networks, which substantiate the following insight:
Insight 3 (Premium Boomerang Density). Premium fake followers are frequently reused to follow customers, resulting in dense external connectivity in the boomerang network.
Interestingly, we see that the relative values of these statistics are inverted for the boomerang networks from the egonetsunlike for egonets where the density metric was an order of magnitude higher for freemium providers, the bipartite density in boomerang networks is instead an order of magnitude higher for the premium providers. Note that the premium providers' bipartite density indicates that nearly 1-2% (a huge amount) of all possible edges between the fake followers and their combined set of friends exists. The node to edge ratios are also much higher for premium providers -fastfollowerz and intertwitter are 1:14, and devumi and twitterboost are roughly 1:37 compared to only 1:2 for the freemium providers.
The freemium boomerang network statistics in Table 3 (bottom) again establish a complementary insight:
Insight 4 (Freemium Boomerang Sparsity). Freemium fake followers are much less reused to follow customers, resulting in sparse external connectivity in the boomerang network .
This is substantiated by the observation that freemium providers have an order of magnitude lower bipartite density than premium ones. Furthermore, despite only considering 1-2K fake followers per each service, we notice that the number of nodes in the boomerang networks are a magnitude higher for freemium over premium providers -intuitively, since the fake followers in freemium providers seem to be otherwise real accounts, they have a more expansive set of true friends as compared to those from premium providers which are purely synthetic. Rationale: Our conjoined egonet and boomerang network analysis clearly illustrates the stylistic differences in the freemium and premium fraud types and their consequences on first and second-order network structure. Freemium fraud providers avoid incurring costs to build up fake follower accounts with which to deliver fake links by incentivizing real users to boost their own follower count via automated follower trading. They then use these same accounts to deliver fake links to paid users, thereby turning a profit. The follower trading mechanism results in dense internal connectivity, but since the fake followers are otherwise real users with an expansive set of friends, external connectivity is small. Premium fraud providers seem to conversely incur the cost of building up a set of synthetic, fake follower accounts, but greatly reuse these accounts to deliver fake links without needing to trade follows between the accounts. This reuse mechanism results in highly sparse or no internal connectivity, but high external connectivity from greater account reuse.
Network Overlap Patterns
In our analysis thus far, we noticed that various providers have different levels of evident overlap in the fake followers they deliver between their 2 honeypots. How extensive is this overlap? Do these providers reuse accounts in the same ways? Furthermore, is there any overlap between the followers across providers? Here, we shed light on these questions. 
Intra-Network Patterns
First, we study intra-network overlap, describing overlap between the fake follower nodes within each service. Table 4 shows the overlap coefficients between the honeypot followers for each service. Assuming the followers for each honeypot are randomly sampled from the service's account pool, we additionally compute the estimated total number of fake accounts currently in the fraud provider's hands using MSE. The various degrees of overlap and commensurate estimates of pool size suggest the following insight:
Insight 5 (Varying Delivery Structure). Service providers have varying methods for account reuse in efforts to to distribute suspicion across their account pools.
We observe that the freemium providers tend to have a high, 0.8 overlap which results in an estimated pool size slightly larger than either of the two sets of honeypot followers. However, the premium providers have an interesting split which reveals that fastfollowerz and intertwitter have very high, near 1.0 overlap, resulting in the pool size being roughly equal to each set of followers. This indicates that the pool is reused almost exactly for multiple customers. Conversely, devumi and twitterboost have near 0 overlap. As a result, we estimate that the pool size is quite large, containing over 55K total fake accounts.
While we cannot be certain without further investigation, these providers likely have different means of selecting and shifting the pool of active fake followers. For example, the pools used in fastfollowerz and intertwitter may cycle between a number of different "sub-pools" based on time, customer account features, or random choice. Conversely, the evidently much larger estimated pool size for devumi and twitterboost suggests that they may each have a single, large fixed pool of usable accounts from which followers are sampled regardless of other factors.
Inter-Network Patterns
Thus far, we have established that providers reuse multiple follower accounts across customers in order to turn a better profit. But how far does this reuse go? Are any accounts responsible for delivering fake links to customers from different providers? To answer these questions, we study the pairwise inter-network overlap of followers between providers. Table 5 shows an 8×8 matrix with the pairwise overlap coefficients. Given the number of nonzero entries, we draw the following surprising insight:
Insight 6 (Collusion). Service providers seem to collaborate with and draw from each other to commit fraudulent actions.
We notice that there is substantial overlap within the freemium and premium providers. While fastfollowerz and intertwitter share no accounts with the other premium providers, devumi and twitterboost have a .07 overlap. Comparatively, all 4 freemium providers have a large 0.6-0.7 overlap, indicating that most of their fake accounts are the same. Furthermore, the set of followers for freemium and premium providers have 0 overlap, substantiating that followers in freemium providers are otherwise real accounts whereas those in premium providers are synthetic.
Nonzero overlap between providers is an interesting finding -it is indicative of either a willingness to share follower accounts between fraud providers, or commonality in leaked or hijacked accounts. Upon further inspection, we notice a number of suggestive findings:
• Overlapping providers shared domain WHOIS protectors.
• Overlapping premium providers use the same Yoast SEO plugin and stylesheets.
• All freemium providers have two-column site structure, advertisted limits of 30K followers, and priced from £9.99.
• All fremium providers contained the line: "[service] is Not Affiliated With OR Endorsed By Twitter.com. " In this section, we study the similarities and differences in account attributes of fake followers. Table 6 shows per-service, per-attribute entropy in bits for a variety of user attributes. These attributes have varying outcome spaces. Creation date has 11 possible years (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) , since Twitter was founded in 2006. Booleans have 2 possible outcomes (T,F). We encountered 35 different language identifiers and 39 UTC timezone settings. For count features, we logarithmically discretized the space into 32 bins from 1 to 1M to capture the wide range of activity levels. For each service, we aggregate attribute values and compute the entropy over the outcomes. The table shows the actual sample entropy in addition to the maximum possible (uniform) entropy. As previously mentioned, lower entropy indicates high synchronicity between followers. Note that a difference in entropy of 1 bit corresponds to twice the predictability.
The most striking insight from Table 6 is as follows:
Insight 7 (Entropy Gap). Premium service providers deliver followers with low entropy, high regularity attributes, whereas freemium service providers have more attribute disparity.
We notice that the premium providers have substantially lower entropy values in many attributes versus freemium providers, and even near 0 entropy in other attributes like geolocation. We elaborate on the specific differences next. Account Creation: devumi, twitterboost and fastfollowerz all have extremely low creation year entropy compared to freemium providers. While both freemium and premium accounts tend to be created more recently (perhaps because of higher suspension rate in older accounts), premium providers have a much heavier bias towards recently created accounts (>2014). Profile Defaults: fastfollowerz has a much lower entropy than other providers in terms of default profile -we found that >84% of these accounts did not have a default profile, whereas default profiles are actually more common than not in freemium accounts. Surprisingly, fastfollowerz, devumi and twitterboost also have near 0 entropy for profile image compared to the much higher entropy for freemium providers. We find that premium followers almost always set a custom image, suggesting that the information was fabricated or stolen from real users. Conversely, default profile images are common for freemium service accounts -this is intuitive, most real users do not fully customize their profiles. Freemium counts in (b) fit similarly, despite with a slightly lower exponent (∼1.15). Comparatively, "smart" premium counts in (c) fit a power law but with much higher exponents (∼ 1.66). Interestingly, we find that "naïve" premium followers do fit a power law, but have unnaturally low exponents (∼.148) due to their low entropy and highly concentrated, robotic behavior.
Action counts: devumi and twitterboost have much lower entropy for action counts (favorites, followers, friends, lists and statuses) compared to freemium providers. fastfollowerz also exhibits lower entropy. As Figure 1d shows, there is even more variation between premium providers. Figure 1d shows that intertwitter (P1 "smart") follower counts are disparate and closer to genuine users' entropy, unlike other premium fraudsters (P2 "naïve") who behave robotically. Comparatively, freemium followers have lower follower count entropy compared to genuine ones, which is intuitive as while the freemium follows are real accounts, their follower counts are not independent from each other due to the follows traded between themselves. Figure 5 shows the rank-frequency plots for follower counts for various follower types. The plots substantiate our observations on entropy, and also show that different user types exhibit different with power-law fit, which is expected for skewed distributions on social networks. While entropy values in this paper are computed empirically using the samples from Table 2 , accounts on real networks have varying follower counts, leading to different entropy estimates even when drawn from the same distribution. Fortunately, we can intimately relate sample size and entropy of a power-law distribution using the Euler-Maclaurin formula as below:
Lemma 1 (Power-Law Entropy). The entropy H of a size |V | sample from a power-law distribution P (r)=C ·r −a is given by:
Proof.
where C =1/H |V |,α (inverse of the V th harmonic number of order α). This estimate enables us to gauge how close varying-sized samples are to the original power-law.
We noticed similar patterns in entropy for status and favorite counts as well. The lower entropy of action counts characteristic of premium providers stems from the variety of options premium providers have for Twitter engagement -in addition to fake followers, the premium providers also offer fake retweets and favorites services. Thus, premium providers are incentivized to reuse accounts for multiple types of fraud, and when done naïvely result in high synchrony in "serviceable" attributes. User settings: fastfollowerz, devumi and twitterboost all have near 0 geolocation, language, and tweet protection entropy. Of these, all devumi and twitterboost accounts use the US English language setting, have geolocation disabled and do not protect tweets. fastfollowerz has a slightly higher language entropy of .06, but we found that all fastfollowerz accounts were either using US or GB English, suggesting a heavy premium provider bias for English accounts. We also found that premium followers almost entirely have USA timezones. Interestingly, "smart" intertwitter followers' high language entropy from Figure 1d suggests an aim to better camouflage user attributes compard to the "naïve" providers. Given that intertwitter also has some verified accounts, we hypothesize that the accounts may be hijacked or at the very least synthetically generated with more sophistication. This is in contrast with freemium providers, which have much higher frequency of enabled geolocation, variance in language and protected tweets. Figure 1d also shows that freemium followers tend to appear similar to genuine ones as they are otherwise real user accounts. However, we find that freemium followers have higher language entropy than genuine ones, as freemium followers are spread over many languages whereas genuine followers tend to disproportionately speak their followee's language. In addition to the attributes reported in Table 6 , we also studied the 160-character user description field. We ask: what, if any, are the differences between freemium and premium follower descriptions? Figure 6 shows two wordclouds, aggregated over description text across all premium and freemium followers respectively. Font size corresponds to relative frequency in the text. For clarity, we remove common stopwords. We arrive at the following insight:
Insight 8 (Clout vs. About). Freemium followers tend to have descriptions focusing on social media clout, whereas premium followers tend to talk about themselves.
Figure 6a (premium), has words like "musician," "lover," "writer" and "sports", corresponding to descriptive personal details -these are likely copied from genuine users. Conversely, Figure 6b (freemium) has terms like "snapchat," "youtube," and "instagram", as these users try to increase clout by advertising their other, real social media pages, i.e., "follow me on snapchat." 
Discriminative Power of Features
Thus far, we have highlighted a number of distributional differences between fraudulent and genuine users. Can we leverage these differences to discriminate user behaviors? In this section, we evaluate a number of attribute features on their discriminative power in a supervised setting.
We classified the engineered entropy features from Table 6 into the following groups based on feature type:
• Connection: # Followers, # Friends • Activity: # Statuses, # Lists, # Favorites • Profile: Default Profile (and Image), Verified, Created • Geography: Language, UTC • All: the union of all above features We evaluate these features using binary classification (genuine vs. fraudulent) as is traditionally done in practice. We use a Support Vector Machine (SVM) with radial basis function (RBF) kernel and 10-fold cross validation. Our carefully assembled ground-truth dataset consists of 307 fraudulent users and 200 genuine users, whose features are computed over their followers. The fraudulent accounts are a combination of premium and freemium honeypots as well as accounts whose profiles have been listed on freemium providers' websites as users of the service. The genuine accounts belong to well-known academics in machine learning and data mining. In reality, getting additional ground-truth labels is very costly and requires careful manual inspection. Figure 7 shows the relative performance of our feature groups in terms of overall precision and recall. We notice that Connection features perform comparatively poorly, Profile and Activity features perform better, Geography performs even better, and the combination All performs near-ideal with .98 precision even with 0.95 recall. Thus, we conclude that our proposed followership entropy features are highly reliable in discerning genuine from fraudulent users.
Future-Proofing Fraud Detection
Thus far, we have seen that link fraud is not unimodal, but rather multimodal. Our results show at least several distinct fraud patterns over the many yet un-suspended accounts, with the possibility of even more. This broaches two important points: 1) simple binary classifiers may not be able to capture all the patterns, and 2) when users exhibiting these patterns are unknown or unlabeled, traditional classifiers will forcibly assign them highly error-prone labels. These scenarios are expected in practice -userbases are large, collecting ground truth is expensive, and minimal labeled points will bias decision boundaries. We propose the following formal problem:
Problem 2 (Risk-averse labeling). Given labeled instances L and unlabeled instances U, classify unlabeled instances and exonerate instances E ∈U which are risky to classify.
To alleviate these problems, we present our unique OEC (Open-ended Classification) approach which not only classifies samples according to known classes, but also draws practitioner attention to, and exonerates those samples which cannot be "safely" classified due to being distant from other samples and unexplored or insufficiently (or entirely) unlabeled. The practitioner can then inspect and label these samples and decide whether they should be part of an existing class or potentially form a class of their own. Our approach aims to improve fraud classification robustness by postponing judgment for risky-to-label points and is motivated by minimizing misclassification, as false positives and negatives are expensive in fraud detection. Figure 2 highlights OEC and its alternative paradigm to standard classification.
OEC first clusters all samples using any non-parametric method -we use G-means [12] which iteratively splits clusters until each cluster resembles a Gaussian according to the Anderson-Darling statistic. Next, each cluster which does not have a class majority of labeled instances (no labels, equal split between classes, etc.) is exonerated. Finally, OEC performs classification using any desired method -we use SVM in experiments. Algorithm 1 gives pseudocode of OEC.
Algorithm 1 OEC : Open-ended Classification
Require: L (labeled instances), U (unlabeled instances) 1: Cluster L ∪ U via a non-parametric method 2: For each cluster without a class majority over L, add the associated instances in U to the exoneration set E 3: Apply standard classification on U −E and return E separately
We evaluated OEC against several baselines. The first is Basic, in which no instances are exonerated and only standard classification is performed. For Random, we exonerated |E| test instances randomly before standard classification, where |E| denotes the number of instances actually exonerated by OEC. OEC Naive is a simple version of OEC which propagates majority class labels to each cluster instead of applying standard classification -it essentially replaces the standard classification with a simple nearest-neighbor-esque approach. Low Confidence intuitively exonerates the |E| instances for which the classifier is most unsure (those closest to the decision boundary).
For our experiment, we used the ground-truth dataset from Section 6 with All features, and randomly initialized L as a small fraction (3%) of all instances. As the exonerated instances are those which OEC believes are prone to misclassification, we used the number of misclassified samples as the metric for our evaluation. Of course, fewer misclassified samples means greater classification accuracy. Figure 8 shows results averaged over 1000 simulations. As expected, Basic misclassifies frequently as it forcibly assigns sparse points far away from the decision boundary the incorrect label - Figures 2b and 2c) show a visual depiction in a selected 2-D subspace. Random misclassifying fewer samples due to random exoneration. OEC Naive performs better than Random, suggesting that it does exonerate more risky points, but due to the simple majority classification process it misclassifies less risky samples. Unsurprisingly, Low Confidence performs better than the other baselines by choosing near-boundary samples to exonerate, albeit with notably higher variance. However, OEC performs the best - Figure 8 shows that even against the next-best baseline, OEC misclassifies 18% fewer samples. Intuitively, Figure  2d shows that OEC classifies points with better accuracy than standard classification but exonerates the distant and unlabeled points which the latter misclassifies.
Conclusion
In this work, we tackled the common practitioner-encountered problem of being tasked with finding fraudulent users in a social network when given limited labeled data. While supervised classification is a common approach to this problem, insufficient labels and unrepresentative labeling in practice can result in poor generalization and misclassification. To address this issue, we first aim to study patterns of fraudster behavior. To do so, we setup honeypot accounts on Twitter, solicit fake followers, and collect and analyze the network and attribute properties of the fraudsters. We discover at least 3 different modalities of fraud, with possibly more, and give numerous observations regarding their behaviors. Secondly, we identify good attribute entropy features that are able to discriminate with high performance (>0.95 precision/recall) genuine users from fraudsters in our ground-truth data set. Finally, we propose our OEC algorithm which leverages non-parametric clustering and traditional supervised classification to infer user labels given limited labeled users while alerting practitioners to poorly labeled or unknown, possibly new classes of users. OEC achieves substantially (18-36%) lower misclassification rate than competing baselines in experiments on our ground-truth data.
